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ABSTRACT
The aim of the article is to present Hannah Arendt’s and Zygmunt Bauman’s theories of democracy 
and the Jewish question. The paper consists of three sections. In the first one, there are explained the main 
concepts of their conceptions of democracy. The second one investigates what the collapse of democracy 
means for both authors. The third one compares Arendt’s and Bauman’s opinions on the Jewish question. 
The conclusions explain the main differences and similarities between the researched theories.
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PREFACE
“It is the same world – and not some landscape on the moon – where the elements 
which eventually crystallized, and have never ceased to crystallize, into totalitari-
anism are to be found” [Arendt 1994 (II): 281]. World in Arendt’s terms occurred to 
be the modern world with its problems and potentiality to crystallize into totalitar-
ianism. Society – mass man – its mentality and lack of political bounds were what 
she stigmatized [Arendt 1961 (I): 199]. Arch evil of our time – as she wrote – had 
also different roots: they were called: Anti-Semitism, Racism, Imperialism [Arendt 
1994 (I): 150]. Her sense of modernity consisted of complex theories. It is difficult 
to explain her whole standpoint in a short article but certainly it is possible to present 
chosen concepts. Thus, the first aim of the article was to refer her explanations on 
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democracy, its collapse and the Jewish question. In other words, firstly, from the 
general concept of modernity I selected and investigated problems connected with 
democracy. Secondly, I focused on antisemitism and narrowed it down to the Jewish 
question. I treated the combination of those subjects as an interesting issue also to 
the contemporary reader. It could be worth to rethink weakness of democracy and 
a problem of minorities which, according to Arendt, are still capable of crystalizing 
into totalitarianism.
The second goal of the paper was to compare Hannah Arendt’s and Zygmunt 
Bauman’s theories. As a generation after the Holocaust we are obligated not to for-
get about it. It is important not to allow it to happen again. Even if we are not able 
to understand the Shoah or refer to its reality, we have the duty which cannot be 
abandoned – remembrance. Introducing to an English language reader the Polish 
thinker in comparison with the world famous writer is the answer to that requirement. 
Especially that his world-renowned book Modernity and the Holocaust seems to be 
more then accurate to that problem. Its content was fundamental to the comparison 
presented in the article.
The paper consists of three sections preceded by the preface and finalized by 
conclusions. Research method was based on concepts investigations. Inference 
term’s meaning consists in an analysis of its contextual surrounding. Outcomes were 
placed in deductive scheme of work. Each paragraph contains helpful explanations 
for understanding the upcoming one. I began with explanations of democracy in both 
authors’ sense. Later – in the second paragraph – I explained their understandings 
of the collapse of democracy. Finally – in the third section – I introduced their opin-
ions on the Jewish question. In other words, to explain the meaning of the collapse 
of democracy I needed to refer the concept of democracy in advance. Against the 
backdrop of the knowledge on the meaning of the collapse, I was able to place the 
problem of the Jewish question.
I am proving a hypothesis that Bauman and Arendt are intercessors of participation 
democracy, but reasons why they treat engagement in public sphere as important are 
different. Also the Jewish question has an extraordinary sense for both authors. Present-
ed work shows two varieties of that problem. The first one is looking for the reason of 
the Jews’ alliance. The second traces the answer to the question: “Why Jews?”. Pres-
entation defends a standpoint which explains those two as a matter of social relations.
CONCEPTS OF DEMOCRACY
Some researchers explain Arendt’s philosophy of democracy as equal to events 
which could be called participation democracy. According to M. P. d’Entreves, 
“[Arendt] saw representation as a substitute for the direct involvement of the citizens, 
and as a means whereby the distinction between rulers and ruled could reassert itself. 
When representation becomes the substitute for direct democracy, the citizens can 
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exercise their powers of political agency only at election day… [for her] democracy 
[is] based on the principles of freedom, plurality, equality and solidarity” [d’Entreves 
2001: 2, 162].
Understanding Arendt’s theory as an example of participation democracy1 re-
quires at least explaining her main concepts which refer to a public sphere. Her view 
on organization as relations between people is rooted in her anthropology. Thus, 
participation democracy written in her terms receives a specific meaning. Her theory 
of public sphere, concepts of freedom, plurality, and equality are crucial.
For the German thinker, freedom and equality are bound together. Based on her 
writings both terms receive two complementary meanings: the first one refers to the 
so-called life necessities, the second one is political. Actually, equality comes from 
freedom which is understood as independence of the necessities of life and utilitarian 
aims. In such an understanding, people who cannot support their existence (house-
hold, health, food, etc.) and whose patterns of behaviour are motivated by utilitarian 
aim or external pressure, are not free. Equality reflects freedom. Individualities are 
not forced by anything to the same extent. Some of them are more skilful, clever 
then others, but all are starting from the same position. What matters, they will show 
their own character [Arendt 1998: 11, 214]. Freedom being understood as independ-
ence of necessities, equality which means the same starting position enable political 
freedom and political equality.2 Freedom – in that second sense – refers to the actual 
participation in a decision-making process of a community. Its actuality is visible in 
Arendt’s explanations of action. Action means freedom [Arendt 1961 (II): 151–152]. 
What needs to be stressed, action is taking place only when it proceeds. In her terms, 
freedom is also being described as public happiness and that kind of happiness means 
the participation in community decisions [Arendt and Reif 1972: 203]. Freedom 
is political because it exists in between people. For Arendt, participation does not 
mean for example: obeying the law or making it.3 In between is bound with human 
ability to behave spontaneously. The closest metaphor which she uses to describe it 
is the parallel of the promise [Arendt 2007 (II)]. Realization of the promise depends 
only on a good will of the person who gives it. Nothing but the person guarantees 
1 Elżbieta Matynia and Danna Villa interpreted Arendt’s theory in terms of performative democracy, 
which still needs to be understood as a participatory variant of democracy. E. Matynia, Performative Democ-
racy, Routledge 2009; D. Villa, Arendt and Heidegger, Princeton University Press 1996, pp. 52–59.
2 H. Arendt, On Revolution, Penguin Books 1990, p. 30; and also H. Arendt, Between Past and 
Future, The Viking Press, New York 1961, p. 148; I found the same observation in Jerome Kohn’s article. 
J. Kohn, Freedom: the priority of the political, [in:] The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, (ed.) 
D. Villa, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000, pp. 114–120.
3 H. Arendt, The Human Condition…, p. 63; H. Arendt, Europe and the Atom Bomb, [in.] Essays 
in Understanding 1930–1953. Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism, Schocken Books, New York 1994, 
p. 420; Paul Ricoeur also noted that freedom for Arendt has pre-legislative character. It rises spontaneous-
ly out of free and equal debate. P. Ricoeur, Power and Violence, [in:] Hannah Arendt. Critical Assessments 
of Leading Political Philosophers, Routledge, London, New York 2006, v. 3, p. 396.
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its realization.4 Freedom means the action: making promises and proceeding them 
with other people. Equality comes from the freedom and it is the acceptance of the 
others. People who cooperate together, who rely on each other guarantee each other 
their status. The action breeds the equality. People do not choose arbitrarily whom 
they like or dislike. On a virtue of action people become equal. The realization of the 
promises brings the acceptance and the confirmation of the status [Arendt 1990: 30].
Arendt’s theory of the public sphere is not understood as an independent insti-
tution or the one that exists its own life. As she wrote: “not Athens, but the Athe-
nians, were the polis” [Arendt 1998: 195]. The German thinker is describing that 
as  plurality. In The Human Condition she explains what is forming each human 
being condition, that are: “conditions under which life on earth has been given to 
man; conditions which were created by human” and “impact of the world’s reality” 
[Arendt 1998: 7–9]. “Conditions under which life on earth has been given to man 
contains: wornness, birth and depth, plurality, natality and mortality”. Each of those 
conditions allows prosecuting one of human activities: labor, work and activity. In 
our case, the most important action is being active which is connected with plurality. 
Activity requires speech to be understandable. Communication is crucial for present-
ing intentions and not to be misunderstood [Arendt 1998: 177].
Both terms have their own specific meanings, different from what they could 
suggest in ordinary life. Human plurality, according to the explanations of the author 
of Origins of Totalitarianism, is a “paradoxical plurality of unique beings” [Arendt 
1998: 176]. Otherness does not mean alternative which is based on one’s charac-
teristic. It describes one’s own character, personality and experience of a particular 
person. Plurality refers to humans who are unrepeatable. Plurality is connected with 
the ability to spontaneous activeness. Every existing human because of his uniqueness 
is able to start extraordinary events. 
Public sphere is built with interactions and relations among its members. To 
explain it in Arendt’s terms: “Action and speech go on between men (…), out of 
which arise (…) specific, objective, worldly interests (…), something which inter-est, 
which lies between people and therefore can relate and bind them together” [Arendt 
1998: 182]. The purpose of being together does not lie in any utilitarian aim. People 
are staying together not because they are pro or contra something. They are able to 
create, and what they create binds them together.
From that perspective, democracy needs to be considered as a special type of 
public interactions but not the political system. That is the outcome of activity. It 
could be found in the social movements where many involved people are acting 
together in the name of a common goal. The participatory aspect of cooperation, 
4 H. Arendt, The Human Condition…, p. 195; Freedom in Arendt’s sense also connects with lie. 
Since human being is a unique existence able to spontaneous actions, it is also able to lie. H. Arendt, Lying 
in Politics: Reflections on The Pentagon Papers, “New York Review of Books”, 17/8, 18 November 1971.
107DEMOCRACY, ITS COLLAPSE AND THE JEWISH QUESTION. COMPARING HANNAH ARENDT’S…
the need to take part in a political decision-making process – political freedom – is 
Arendt’s great demand and the fundament of her theory.
In Arendt’s thought there is a problem of how to classify democracy, because it 
could be treated as a frame of public behaviours. As an artifact it should belong to 
the world of things (wordiness) which, in Arendt’s terms, may not be mixed up with 
plurality. Interactions are obviously previous then their effects. If the public sphere is 
treated as a being in between of plurality, and excludes effects of activeness as made 
by man, it will stay undisturbed. Its development would be limited to the history as 
a collective memory.5 If the effects of activity are included in that sphere, the border 
to them would be freedom and equality, they can break those two.
It is hard to make a clear standpoint in that case. Reflection of that issue is present 
in the literature on Arendt’s thought. For example, A. Heller is trying to prove that 
freedom is significant to the described sphere of public life [Heller 1987]. A Polish 
researcher J. P. Hudzik is treating a public field as an effect of social agreement 
[Hudzik 2002: 86–87]. For the purpose of that work, I am going to treat democracy 
in Arendt’s writings as describing participation democracy and developing it by 
adding the outcomes of activity.
There is no clear explanation in Bauman’s Modernity and the Holocaust about 
the concept of democracy. The author may use that term but still his explanations 
are not sufficient to understand his thought right away. In one of the chapters he 
proposes: “If we ask now what the original sin was which allowed this [Holocaust6] 
to happen, the collapse (or non-emergency) of democracy seems to be the most con-
vincing answer” [Bauman 2000: 111]. Furthermore, “after communal mechanisms 
of social regulation (…) disappeared (…), the void tends to be filled by new (…) 
supra-communal forces (…). [Those] dislocations may differ in form and intensity, 
but they are united by the general effect of the pronounced supremacy of political 
over economical and social power” [Bauman 2000: 112].
Citations which were brought above contain two main thoughts. Bauman con-
ceives the process of democracy as collapsing or at last partially responsible for the 
Shoah. Secondly, he is describing democracy in terms of a communal activity in 
social regulations fields.
In investigating what Bauman means when he describes communal involvement 
[R.H.], and also how he differs political and social behaviors it is easy to recognize 
5 For Arendt, the ancients developed the concept of history as a communal memory. People were 
attending public sphere in hope that theirs acts would be remembered by future generations. That was the 
only way to become immortal. H. Arendt, Human Condition…, p. 18, and H. Arendt, Between Past and 
Future…, pp. 43–45.
6 I am conscious that the term Holocaust, could have had different connotations. Deriving it from 
its religious sense as a burnt offering, I am going to use it to describe a systematic murder committed 
on the Jewish nation. It has a close connection with two other words: Churban and Shoah. The first one 
means destroying existing things and beginning for new events. Because of unexplainable sense of the 
new beginning I prefer using the word Shoah. Its connotation is bound with the uniqueness of the twenti-
eth-century events and also loneliness of the Jews in their experience.
RADOSŁAW HARABIN108
that the sphere of social life means interactions between humans under nobody’s 
control. Bauman is making sharp distinctions between social and societal spheres. His 
thought: “context of coexistence (…), being with others, that is, a social context (…); 
supra-individual agencies of training and enforcement, that is, of a societal context” 
[Bauman 2000: 179]. Training and enforcement describe influence on somebody’s 
decisions. Desirable appearance of relationships in democracy conditions requires 
behaviours without an extraneous impact. Opinions can be formed on the basis of 
communications and reasonable calculations but not on having been manufactured. 
For the Polish writer, thinking (reasonable calculation) signifies having critical view 
on a heterogeneous world [Bauman 2000: 178].
If it is necessary to investigate his theory of critical thinking deeper, it should be 
connected with the analyses of Milgram’s experiment. Bauman is using that example 
to show the impact of authorities on somebody’s decision. He is explaining: “what 
Milgram must have meant by ‘real life’ was life inside a democratic society (…), 
under conditions of pluralism”. We could ask what is building that pluralism, where 
are its roots? Explanation could be found in the same text: “unequivocal source of 
authority (…) [following] own judgment” [Bauman 2000: 165].
Bauman does not distinguish acts of thinking and judging, as Arendt does. It 
looks like Bauman could mean similar processes of mind activity without precise 
descriptions. His critical view has similar features to Arendt’s thinking as a wind 
of reason. Her concept of thinking could be explained by four points: speculative 
character; gives no outcomes; dialogical character and lastly, it does not neces-
sarily have references to the real world [Arendt 1978 (II): 178, 99, 46]. The most 
important for the tracked argumentation is its speculative character – looking for 
presuppositions and their foundations. Thinking eliminates all established senses. 
Judging is bound with common sense which could be understood as a mind opera-
tion founded on feelings instead of concepts. Concepts make sense, and the sense 
is always connected with an individual experience. There is a presupposition that 
as members of the human species one feels similar enough to choose how the other 
could behave.7 Its outcome has also aspirations to be a general principle, because 
it is based on convenience of making the right decision. By that, the active person 
is able to chose the “right way” when there is nothing what is indicating the choice 
[Arendt 1961 (I): 223–225].
Similarities between Bauman’s and Arendt’s explanations lie in comparing 
Arendt’s concept of thinking with his idea of critical reasoning and her judging 
with his plurality of authorities (everybody is entitled to one’s own opinion).
Democracy for Bauman is a description of power – as it was shown in the first 
citation. It is the outcome of human interaction based on critical calculations. Social 
behaviours require conditions of pluralism – variety of opinions and diversity of 
7 Explanation is drawn from the interpretation of sensus communis proposed by J. Szczepański, 
Polityczna władza sądzenia, WUJ, Kraków 2009, pp. 79–80. 
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being (heterogeneous world – it is hard to say if that term for Bauman refers to the 
acceptance of all social behaviours. Thus, in the presented work it will be treated 
mostly as a pluralism of opinions). What is important: “for Bauman, it is democracy 
that is the ultimate guarantor of individual freedom, not the other way round (…), 
the individual agent cannot be imagined, let alone talked about alone; social action 
should not be understood as taking place in a vacuum or ‘starting from scratch’; 
that human lives are lived together is a given, because they are by necessity built on 
social relations. In other words, for Bauman, “structure and agency leap together” – 
explains Tony Blackshaw [Blackshaw 2005: 10]. For Arendt, actions build the sphere. 
Another question which could occur after a given explanation would have the 
following shape: what does power mean for the Polish sociologist? Is it possible 
to give only general solutions in an enigmatic clarification? Bauman: “any impov-
erishment of grass-root ability to articulate interest and self-govern (…), each step 
towards the weakening of the social foundations of political democracy make a social 
disaster on a Holocaust scale” [Bauman 2000: 115]. Social foundation and political 
democracy are two sides of democracy in general. Government, political decisions 
require legitimization which could be given by members of a society. Power will 
refer to acts of creation the social regulations. Power is the ability to manage the 
social relations through a set of laws.
To conclude, democracy for Bauman means pluralism of standpoints which 
could be articulated and implemented. It contains two elements: opinions formed 
by critical reasoning and organization of social life – rules, institutions, etc. which 
allow their realization.
THE COLLAPSE OF DEMOCRACY 
The collapse of democracy in Arendt’s terms is deeply connected with her concept 
of freedom. In her description, the public sphere started to fall with the occurrence 
of social claims. She explains that the attitude spread only among court members 
– especially Louis the XIV’s Versailles. With the French Revolution it has been ex-
tended to all people [Arendt 1961 (I): 199–200]. “Arena” which used to be reserved 
for disinterested action, becomes a “place” to articulate everybody’s needs.
The collapse of democracy refers to the situation when people stopped caring 
about making glorious things – showing their uniqueness – searching for participation 
in politics. They do not pay attention to anything but being satiated and having fun. 
Their interactions with other people are only dependent on “what they will get?”.8 
8 A laconic explanation given in the presented work is a result of a restricted convention of an ut-
terance. Arendt is explaining mentality (general tendencies in people’s attitude) of mass society member 
in the following terms: loneliness, excitability and lack of standards, inability to judge, egocentricity. The 
frame of that work does not allow to explain them, especially it would require references to many parts 
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That critique struck into something which – in Arendt’s terms – was social, deprived 
of freedom. In 1975, a couple of months before her death she had published Home 
to Roost. From the perspective of almost thirty years after the Second World War, 
she reproached all symptoms of the crisis of the Republic – the form of government 
and its institutions of political freedom. McCarthyism, the Vietnam War, Watergate 
they slowly crumbled exemplars of public life – Arendt wrote [Arendt 1975]. She 
did not care of economical, diplomatic or inter party system consequences. She was 
anxious because of disintegration of common life – plurality which acts together.
For Arendt, destroyed democracy means removing requirement of political free-
dom from the public life. It refers to a selfish action for own goodness, lack of political 
bounds and the absence of participation in decision-making process. Freedom, in her 
sense, is the actual action: it is taking place only when it proceeds in between many. 
Egoistic, egocentric, lonely peoples are not interested in and not able to build political 
bounds. Plurality which is the condition of political freedom is abandoned. Simply, 
in a modern society, freedom which is constitutive for democracy stopped to exist.
Bureaucracy, administration and social designing are the biggest opponents of 
democracy for Bauman. Sin which was committed by the modern society consists in 
developing administration fields instead of involving themselves in the decision-mak-
ing process. For the Polish writer, modern people are subordinated to instrumental 
rationality [Bauman 2000: 115]. They are looking for the most efficient solutions 
for every case. Experiments and experts have the highest values. Knowledge which 
could be proven by a given expertise is placing people in social hierarchy [Bauman 
2000: 198]. The really significant problem lies in rejection of old authorities as 
experts. Such a step refers to the doubt of usefulness of communal impact in fully 
effective social process. As he explains: traditional authorities were uncomfortable 
for the modern world because “first, they left the primeval, communal controls of 
order intact (…); second, they weakened (…) the possibility of organized action on 
a supra-communal level” [Bauman 2000: 112].
For Bauman, functionalism is the principle of a modern state. It arises from in-
strumental rationality. The utility of a thing is measured by its capability of reaching 
a particular aim. Calculation is leading to the optimal outcome, is excluding inef-
fective factors: a social decision and those who were defending it: old authorities. 
In the described order there is no place for plurality of opinions. Consensus and 
communication is replaced by the command and administration [Bauman 1992: 23]. 
Participation democracy was changed into bureaucracy, which means sets of 
experts responsible for particular tasks. They have their part to do and they are 
trying to make it perfect. As the author of Liquid Modernity explains: “knowledge 
of final outcome is redundant, and certainly irrelevant as far as the success of his 
own [member of administration] part of the operation goes” [Bauman 2000: 100]. 
of Arendt’s philosophy. Thus, they will be left only as indicators of the main thought described above. 
H. Arendt, Between Past…, pp. 198–199.
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Described “switch” has its own price. Bureaucracy is followed by a huge danger. 
Using Bauman’s words: “ [it] is not merely a tool, which can be used (…) at one 
time for cruel and morally contemptible, at another for deeply humane purposes 
(…). Bureaucracy is more like a loaded dice. It has a logic (…). It renders some 
solutions more, and other solutions less probable” [Bauman 2000: 104]. Logic, 
which was mentioned above, could be described in the following terms: effect of 
distance; functional division of labor; cost of effects. Work on some task is divided 
according to calculation of its effectiveness. According to Bauman, people employed 
in administration, or ,better said, with an administrative attitude are dealing with 
the sense and not with the object. They have their own tables and graphs; they are 
not watching enemies but objects which need to be removed by pressing a button 
[Taylor 2010: 154].
“Democracy where critique becomes a cliché, being for the other becomes living 
with the abyssal other in fearful competition, and freedom of expression in public 
becomes freedom to pursue recognition through fame and conspicuous consumption” 
[Featherstone 2010: 135] – Mark Featherstone explains Bauman’s concerns.
For the Polish thinker, the collapse of democracy means substituting participation 
democracy by administration, pluralism of standpoint by functional division of labor.
THE JEWISH QUESTION
In the presented paper, the Jewish question will have two meanings. The first 
one is connected with K. Marx’s On the Jewish Question. This is an issue of the 
Jews’ position in the society; the problem of separateness and the reason for their 
alliance. Marx explains: “We are trying to break with the theological formulation of 
the question. For us, the question of the Jew’s capacity for emancipation becomes 
the question: What particular social element has to be overcome in order to abolish 
Judaism?” [Marx 1844: 21]. He leaves the problem of the Jew’s belief and focuses 
on social relations. As he continues further: “let us consider the actual, worldly Jew 
– not the Sabbath Jew (…), not look for the secret of the Jew in his religion, but let 
us look for the secret of his religion in real Jew (…), self-interest (…), huckstering 
(…), money” [Marx 1844: 21]. The second form of the question is connected with 
experience of the Holocaust. That problem could be concluded in simple: “Why 
Jews?”. Both forms could be found in Arendt’s and Bauman’s thoughts.
Arendt distinguishes a social and political problem of the Jewish case. The first 
one is the matter of acceptance by society, other Jews and themselves. The second 
refers to minority rights.9 Following R. J. Bernstein’s thought, the social problem 
in Arendt’s books has two meanings. The first one refers to the figure of parvenu, 
9 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Harcourt, San Diego, London, New York 1976, pp. 
55–56.
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the second refers to the description of the concept of pariah [Bernstein 1996: 22]. 
Arendt believes these were the two ways which the Jews were choosing when facing 
the requirement of association. In The Origins of Totalitarianism, she mentions the 
category of average Jews. They were different from the other two, because they had 
no consciousness of choice. They treated their successes and failures as an effect of 
their Jewish roots [Arendt 1962: 67].
For Arendt, the Jewish question is connected with the identity of the Jew. In the 
background, there is placed social perception of Moses’ tribe as a result of the Jews’ 
self-defining. Parvenu as she explains: “[had] brilliant individual careers and been 
granted considerable privileges by theirs masters, they formed community of excep-
tions (…), they stood, in a sense, as far outside Jewish society as they did outside 
Gentile society” [Arendt 1962: 63]. That was a way of assimilation – climbing on 
a social ladder. The paradox lies in that they were trying to sink into society – avoid 
their Jewish roots – but they were using the Jewish privileges to reach higher social 
levels. They were strangers among themselves and other people.
Pariah is an outsider which is caring for his own identity. Bernstein emphasizes 
that in Arendt’s view, assimilation requires members of a society being the same 
[Bernstein 1996: 44]. Pariah’s choice is limited to two options: living in pace with 
society but avoiding one’s own identity or keeping itself but becoming a rebel. The 
article Jew as a pariah introduces four types of outsiders and also suggests a lack of 
alternatives in the existence of Jews [Arendt 1978 (I)]. Assimilation requires quieting 
the fact of being a Jew and for Arendt that is impossible.10
Figures of parvenu and pariah describe social side of the Jewish question. The 
main problem lies in the fact that the question has become a political issue as well. 
According to Arendt, in the 19th and 20th centuries, Jews had the same status as mi-
norities in the national state. They were protected not by the acceptance of a domi-
nant nation (in other terms they were not equal) but their status was guaranteed by 
the external treaties and laws [Arendt 1962: 270]. The Nazis used the question as 
a political tool. The “average Jew” becomes the “Jew everywhere and nowhere” – 
as Arendt explains [Arendt 2007 (III): 93]. The Jewish problem, which originally 
had a social overtone, happened to be an ideological instrument of manipulation. 
The real aim of Nazi leaders – total domination – was hidden behind the ideolog-
ical cliché. Antisemitism raised on the Jewish question received a purpose to give 
10 R. J. Bernstein pays attention to Arendt’s concept of Jewishness as a thing which cannot be avoid-
ed by Jew. They are able to quit Judaism but never do it. He gave a wide critique of that concept as 
problematic and having not sufficient explanations. In other place of his book he is describing Arendt’s 
distinction on state liberty and personal freedom – which is understood as a lack of life necessities, utilitar-
ian and other pressure. It looks like a solution for Bernstein’s doubts could be found in Arendt’s concept of 
human condition. It could be interpreted as an individual existence under conditions (they were explained 
up above). In this way, Jewishness will equal to each Jew human condition. In this term, avoiding it will 
mean quieting yourself – lack of freedom to develop own personality. R. J. Bernstein, Arendt and the 
Jewish Question…, pp. 29–31. 
113DEMOCRACY, ITS COLLAPSE AND THE JEWISH QUESTION. COMPARING HANNAH ARENDT’S…
masses a goal of realization. To Fűhrer and his closest surrounding, it had a different 
meaning – it masked their true endeavour: omnipotence (total domination) [Arendt 
1962: 385–387, 437–438].
For Arendt, totalitarianism is a system aspired to poses and rule subordination 
without any borders. The final aim of death camps was not the extermination of 
people, but the annihilation of their personalities (uniqueness and ability to being 
spontaneous) [Arendt 1962: 458].
From that perspective the German philosopher is giving two solutions of the 
problem: why Jews? First, Jews were perceived by the society as having an inde-
pendent behaviour. The second solution lies in eternal hostility [Arendt 1962: 8]. 
Independent behaviour, basically for Arendt, means described figures of the 
average Jew, parvenu and pariah. More interesting is the category of eternal hos-
tility. She blames Jews because of their historiography resulting in miscarrying of 
political involvement. She describes Jews’ understanding of antisemitism in terms 
of messianic role in history. They believed that all catastrophes which affected 
them were the effect of their unique predestination. They were treating symptoms 
of hostility as normal. They found them as helpful in keeping them bound together 
[Arendt 1962: 7–9]. This mistake made Theodor Herzl and his successors [Arendt 
2007 (V): 375–376]. Arendt was convinced that antisemitism in any case cannot 
be treated as a useful phenomena to Jews. From her point of view, Jewish leaders 
lacked understanding of political matters. They stayed ignorant to one main fact: 
equality comes from action, freedom means participation. The greatest Jews’ mis-
take was – in Arendt terms – of political character. Lack of interest in participation 
in decision-making process – freedom – placed them in a miserable social position. 
They were deprived of acceptance which, for Arendt, was born in action. Acting 
together with other nations could bring Jews the equality – the acceptance due to 
cooperation side by side with others. “For two hundred years we have let ourselves 
be convinced that the surest way to survive is to play dead” [Arendt 2007 (IV): 
165] – she wrote critically. Pretending dead meant the absence of collective effort 
in politics. Paraphrasing Arendt: Jews abandoned all patterns of democracy but, for 
them, democracy did not collapse it had simply no meaning.
Bauman in Modernity and the Holocaust is describing social relations between 
Jews and their surroundings then explaining roots of their alienation. It is possible 
to find four descriptions of such a relation: 1) theory of an alien inside of mobile 
class 2) antisemitism as a substitution of anticapitalism 3) internationals in times 
of nationalism 4) reference to Christianity. Giving the description of features of the 
diaspora could be partially responsible for such a situation from the Jewish side. He 
mentions: the sheer length of history time (diachronic continuity and synchronic 
identity), self-reproducing capacity, universality of homelessness [Bauman 2000: 
34–35]. Those characteristics could refer to the cause of Jewish disintegration with 
society but the problem looks like it is more sophisticated. Let us research given 
theories for the purpose of receiving a wider perspective on the whole thought.
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Bauman: “They assimilated themselves to their own assimilation, since this was 
the only place where they could go. Kafka caught it very well, using the metaphor 
of a four-legged animal: its hind legs have already left the ground but the fore-legs 
cannot find a place on which to rest” [Bauman, Kilminster, Varcoe 1990: 227]. It 
was a situation of contingency and choice, they had to choose the assimilation and 
abandonment of Jewishness, or their own identity instead of relations with society. 
That was contradiction without solution.11 “I propose that the conceptual Jew has been 
historically construed as the universal ‘viscosity’ of the Western world” [Bauman 
2000: 40] – wrote Bauman. The following citation stands for all categories men-
tioned above. Universal viscosity includes all four given explanations. Jews could 
be placed as a cause of every social problem. The very important thing which needs 
to be underlined is connected with the conceptual character of the Jew as visqueux. 
Firstly, concepts always belong to somebody; secondly, Bauman emphasizes the 
conceptual character as different from the experienced relations with Jews. In this 
way, the Polish sociologist shifts the Jewish question from “how do the Jews and 
their surroundings coexist?” to “how does the society treat them?”. Also, in that 
question they is treated as a general category – the conceptual Jew. In such a case, 
people are not dealing with a Jewish neighbour, friend, known person but with an 
imaginary object.
In summary, Bauman’s question is found on social relations but specifically 
consists in social reception of Moses’ tribe.
Confirmation of that hypothesis can be found in descriptions in the above men-
tioned four categories. Bauman accepts perspective of a Polish researcher, Anna Żuk, 
who is describing Jews as a mobile class in feudal times. To use his words: “mobile 
class [means] subject of emotions usually directed by the more highly-placed social 
groups to the lower classes, and conversely”. Further he explains: “what made the 
Jewish placement in the class war truly special was that they had become objects of 
(…) mutually opposed (…) class antagonisms” [Bauman 2000: 44, 45]. On the basis 
of the text, it is hard to say how the author is treating the presence of antagonism in 
a class society. It looks like he is referring to the past situation without explaining 
its logic. He is placing Jews in that “world” as strangers who are the victims of all 
classes’ frustrations. 
Discussing the second point of Bauman’s explanation, the best way to show his 
idea is to use the same example. The author of Culture as Praxis is making refer-
ence to Marx and his concept of the Jew [Bauman 2000: 48]. Even in this writing, 
when Marx’s theory was partially introduced, he is able to recognize the connection 
11 For Bauman, contingency and choice characterize the contemporary society. “Nothing is given; 
everything must be made” – there are no evident choices, all of them are subject to risk. Z. Bauman, 
R. Kilminster, I. Varcoe, 1990. Sociology, postmodernity and exile: an interview with Zygmunt Bauman, 
[in:] Z. Bauman, Intimations of Postmodernity, Routledge London, New York. Z. Bauman, 1992. Intima-
tions of Postmodernity, Routledge London, New York, and Z. Bauman, 2002. The 20th Century: the End 
or a Beginning?, “Thesis Eleven”, no. 70.
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of antisemitism with anticapitalism. He is researching Jews as those whose God is 
mammon and whose practical view is equal with self-interest. That means that the 
Jew was recognized as a part of society which was having money. Still, the main point 
of analyzing the thought lies in perceptions of Jews and not in their characteristics.
For Bauman, the problem of the Holocaust is bound with his theory of democ-
racy collapse. What he describes as politics is opposite to social solutions in public 
sphere. The term politics describes a functional way of thinking. From the perspec-
tive of the final aim, all behaviours are considered as functional or dysfunctional. 
Only a particular idea is treated as valid – there is no place for diversity of views. 
Everything that has no purpose to the final outcome does not matter. Politics could 
be identified with bureaucratic attitude. Logic of it, the same as a dice, could give 
a certain outcome with different results. One of possibilities leads to mass murder.
According to the given explanation, the Polish thinker answers the main question 
of that paragraph in the following way: “For the thousand-year Reich – the kingdom 
of the liberated German Spirit (…), kingdom which had no room for anything but the 
German Spirit (…), had no room for the Jews” [Bauman 2000: 68]. In the functional 
logic of the plan, to reach full development of Germans, there was no place for aliens.
CONCLUSIONS
Similarity between concepts of democracy lies in assigning a big role to heteroge-
neity by both authors. They have the same view that plurality and participation in the 
decisive process are building democracy. For both thinkers, plurality of opinions and 
diversity of human characters are more than important for the public sphere. Arendt 
is looking for personal peculiarity of man. Every single human being has his/her own 
human condition, which the highest level of development is the public sphere. The 
roots of difference lie in human existence, not in the activity of thinking (thinking, 
judging willing are activities that are displays of human condition). Communal impact 
for Bauman could be described in terms of participating democracy but only from 
the point where democracy is seen as an effect of plurality. People are different; they 
have different opinions and they could and wish to try their implementation. If we 
investigate the roots of variety in both cases they will have their own explanations. 
For the Polish thinker, diversity of standpoints is a result of human critical activity. 
In understanding freedom, a difference can be found. Arendt’s understanding of 
political freedom does not include taking care of living necessities and utilitarian 
aims. In her view, a healthy public sphere is free of careerists, nepotism and similar. 
Freedom, in her terms, does not mean opportunities, it refers to action. It is of actual 
– not potential – character. Even though Bauman in Modernity and the Holocaust is 
not giving description of freedom, it is possible to deduct some problems from his 
thought. If a rational critic of surrounding gives the base for plurality and that situa-
tion is desirable, both conceptions will exclude from democracy different things. If 
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freedom means: having right to one’s own opinion and the opportunity to realize it. 
The Polish thinker’s philosophy cannot avoid public sphere persons who are looking 
for profits. Their standpoints need to find a place in a social context as one of a va-
riety of opinions. The only barrier is constituted by the prohibition of enforcement.
Importance of participation in public life is the biggest similarity between Bau-
man’s and Arendt’s thoughts. Concepts of freedom for both theories have different 
consequences. Democracy for Arendt means sphere without actions being determined 
by living necessities or an external pressure. Bauman explains the mentioned term by 
referring to plurality of opinions and opportunity to its implementation. Both writers 
do not give complex explanations about organization of the democratic state. They 
emphasize points which they treat as key issues.
Even in the biggest difference, which refers to their explanations of roots of the 
Nazi system and the Holocaust event, the main thesis is its legitimization. Bauman 
is blaming bureaucratic solutions of governing. People are not interested in public 
life. They leave decisive actions to the experts in that profession. The problem with 
this solution lies in logic of administration – it does not care about people. 
What is important for the main hypothesis in a drawn vision, participation still 
plays a main role. Substituting one’s own presence in public life with the bureaucratic 
system is the main idea of Bauman’s critic. Arendt perceives collapse of democracy 
in terms of developing social care. Members of society are pushing responsibility 
of their own lives on others. They stop caring about politics; they only need public 
support and fun. Individuals are not anxious about politics. They are looking for 
benefits. That presence in communal life is even worst than Bauman’s lack of its 
attendance. With developing social complaints they envelop public sphere, they 
become lonely – without political bounds and freedom – crowd.
Even in the standpoint on the Jewish question, there is the importance of pub-
lic attendance. Arendt investigates identity of Jews and its social reception. She 
blames Moses’ tribe for miscarriage of political engagement. The status of parvenu 
or pariah – as she explains – only for the Jews had no political meaning. Bauman 
sees that problem differently. He explains the Jews status as an outcome of social 
antagonism and their alien appearance. Only in that point there is no connection 
with public engagement.
To answer the initial aims, experience which comes from that work is attached 
to the importance of public actions. Critical points of view and unselfish actions 
make the foundation of the desirable world in both conceptions. Opportunity of 
participation in a communal decision is not sufficient to build the public sphere. 
Engagement is strongly required. Maybe with such awareness we will be able to 
avoid history repentance.
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